A recent case from the Maryland federal court highlights the need for an employee claiming that he or she was subject to an unlawful hostile environment (based on sex, race, national origin, religion, disability, age, and/or color to plead specific facts to support such a claim under federal.
In Garcia v. Teledyne Energy Systems, Inc., the employee had alleged that he was subjected to unlawful discrimination and a hostile environment based on his national origin (Hispanic). The only allegation in support of the hostile environment claim was that the employee’s coworkers called him a “spic” on one occasion. The Maryland federal court, adhering to controlling case law, held that one instance of being called a racial epithet is not sufficient to state a hostile environment claim. The Court stated:
The complaint describes only one instance of race-related harassment, in which Plaintiff’s co-worker referred to him with a racial epithet. Although the use of such language is offensive and deplorable, a single race-based comment is generally not sufficiently severe or pervasive to “alter the ‘conditions’ of the victim’s employment.” Mosby-Grant, 630 F.3d at 335, 336-37; see Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (“isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment”). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a racially hostile work environment.
The Maryland federal court also dismissed the employee’s retaliation ruling, that under Fourth Circuit authority, the employee could not reasonably believe that he had been discriminated against based on incident of race-name calling. The Court stated:
Title VII only protects an employee’s complaint about a hostile work environment if there is an actual hostile work environment or the employee could reasonably have believed there was one. Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2006). As explained above, the single race-based incident described in the complaint does not support a finding of a hostile work environment. Furthermore, no objectively reasonable person could have believed that it did. See id. at 340-41 (holding that a single slur did not support an objectively reasonable belief that a Title VII violation had occurred); Francisco v. Verizon South, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 705, 727 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“Where a retaliation claim is based on the employee’s complaints about a hostile work environment, a single incident is insufficient to create an objectively reasonable belief that a violation of Title VII was actually occurring.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for retaliation.
Lastly, the Court acknowledged that dismissing the retaliation claim was mandatory under controlling law, but expressed reservations about that mandated result:
The rule announced in Jordan is the law in this circuit and controls this case. However, the Court is not convinced that this rule reflects wisdom or fairness. It is unclear whose interests are served by a rule that disincentivizes early cooperation between employers and their employees who are subjected to race-based mistreatment by co-workers. ... Indeed, it seems likely that a conscientious employer would prefer to be made aware of race-based discrimination before it becomes sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working environment and potential liability. Furthermore, as Judge King noted in dissenting from Jordan, this rule is unfair in light of the duty that Title VII imposes on employees to report harassing and offensive conduct or else be found “complicit in the conduct.” 458 F.3d at 354 (King, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Given the “unique, additive character” of hostile work environment claims, employees are required to assist employers in heading off hostile work environments before they are actionable. Id. at 354-355. “Only a tortured reading of Title VII can validate the proposition that an employee who has taken a step necessary to avoid complicity in a Title VII violation has not” engaged in an activity protected by Title VII. Id. at 355.
The lesson learned from this case is that any complaint for discrimination and/or retaliation must plead specific multiple facts to support the claims. Just one instance of discrimination and/or retaliation is not enough.
